kawa
17f6010a93
Security review fixes: - Constrain OAuth connect returnUrl to a site-relative path so the redeemable token_key can't be redirected off-domain (was a refresh- token leak / connection hijack) - Route all login redirects (entra/dev/local) through ToLocalReturnUrl, also closing a protocol-relative // open redirect in local-login - Neutralize CSV formula prefixes in both audit-log exporters via CsvSanitizer - Force Secure flag on the prod auth cookie (Always, not SameAsRequest) - Gate admin pages with an app_role-claim "Admin" policy instead of a render-time check Findings and rationale recorded in SECURITY-TODO.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
52 lines
4.1 KiB
Markdown
52 lines
4.1 KiB
Markdown
# Security findings
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Review date: 2026-06-11. Items 1–4 and 6 fixed the same day; #5 reviewed and accepted by design.
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---
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## 1. [HIGH] ✅ FIXED — Open redirect in `/connect/initiate` leaked SharePoint session tokens
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**Was:** `returnUrl` from the query string was stored verbatim in the OAuth flow state and used as the final redirect target after the code exchange — with `token_key` (a 2-minute, redeemable handle to the connected client's refresh token) appended. `…?returnUrl=https://evil.com` leaked that handle off-domain, enabling connection hijack.
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**Fix:** `returnUrl` is now constrained to a site-relative path via the new `string.ToLocalReturnUrl()` helper before it is stored ([Infrastructure/OAuth/OAuthEndpoints.cs](Infrastructure/OAuth/OAuthEndpoints.cs)). The helper rejects absolute *and* protocol-relative (`//host`, `/\host`) URLs.
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---
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## 2. [MEDIUM] ✅ FIXED — CSV formula injection in audit-log exports
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**Was:** Both audit CSV exporters quoted per RFC 4180 but didn't neutralize a leading `=` `+` `-` `@`, so user-controlled fields (display/client/site names, details) could execute as formulas in Excel.
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**Fix:** Both paths now use `CsvSanitizer.Escape` (which neutralizes formula prefixes): the `/audit/export` endpoint ([Program.cs](Program.cs)) and `AuditService.ExportCsvAsync` ([Services/Audit/AuditService.cs](Services/Audit/AuditService.cs)). The local `CsvEscape`/`Esc` duplicates were removed.
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---
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## 3. [LOW-MEDIUM] ✅ FIXED — Spoofable `X-Forwarded-Proto` could yield a non-Secure auth cookie
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**Was:** Forwarded headers are trusted from any source (proxy IP unknown inside the container network), and the prod auth cookie used `SecurePolicy = SameAsRequest` — so a spoofed `X-Forwarded-Proto: http` or a direct plaintext hit could emit a non-Secure cookie.
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**Fix:** Prod auth cookie now uses `CookieSecurePolicy.Always` ([Program.cs](Program.cs)), so the Secure flag is set regardless of the (untrusted) forwarded scheme. The forwarded-headers trust config is unchanged (still required behind the proxy); the residual XFF concern is limited — client IP is not used for auth and is not recorded in the audit log.
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---
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## 4. [LOW] ✅ FIXED — Open redirect in `/account/login/entra` and `/account/login/dev`
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**Was:** `returnUrl` was used directly as the post-auth redirect on the entra and dev sign-in paths; only local-login validated it (and even that check allowed protocol-relative `//evil.com`).
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**Fix:** All three sign-in redirects now route `returnUrl` through `ToLocalReturnUrl()` ([Program.cs](Program.cs)), which also closes the protocol-relative gap in the old local-login check.
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---
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## 5. [LOW] ⚪ ACCEPTED (by design) — Authenticated users can download any export / report
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**Where:** `/export/download/{fileName}` and `/reports/download/{id}` ([Program.cs](Program.cs)).
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**Decision:** Not changed. The app has no per-user profile authorization anywhere — any tech may select and use any shared profile (see the "standard techs use profiles without sign-in" design), and `GeneratedReport` carries only a `ProfileId`, no owner. Reports are listed and shared *per client/profile*, not per user, so per-user download scoping would contradict the product model rather than fix a boundary. Both endpoints already require authentication and strip path traversal (`Path.GetFileName`). Revisit only if a per-tech profile ACL is introduced.
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---
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## 6. [LOW] ✅ FIXED — Admin pages gated only by a render-time role check
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**Was:** `/admin/users` and `/admin/audit` used `@attribute [Authorize]` (any authenticated user) plus an in-markup `if (Role != Admin) return;`.
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**Fix:** Added an `Admin` authorization policy (`RequireClaim("app_role", "Admin")`) in [Program.cs](Program.cs) and both pages now use `[Authorize(Policy = "Admin")]` ([UserManagement.razor](Components/Pages/Admin/UserManagement.razor), [AuditLogs.razor](Components/Pages/Admin/AuditLogs.razor)). A claim-value policy (not `[Authorize(Roles=…)]`) was used deliberately: the local/dev sign-in identities don't set a `ClaimTypes.Role` claim, so a Roles check would have silently denied local admins. The in-component checks were kept as defense-in-depth.
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