Session - COOKIE_SECURE=false no longer persists the owner key for ten years. services/session.cookie_kwargs() drops max_age in that mode, so the browser holds the key in memory and the session ends with the window. Everything still persists server-side; only the browser link is temporary. base.html shows a warning banner (FR/EN) and an extra paragraph in the onboarding modal, and the README explains the trade-off and the backup-key escape hatch. - Both cookie writers (middleware, POST /session/restore) go through cookie_kwargs() so the policy cannot drift between them. - The CSRF guard on /session/restore compared request.url.scheme against the Origin header. Behind a TLS-terminating proxy uvicorn sees http while the browser sends https, so every legitimate restore was rejected with 403. It now compares hosts only, including X-Forwarded-Host. - /static/*, /favicon.ico and /robots.txt skip the middleware. Each cookieless hit was inserting an Owner row no browser could ever use. Reliability - Malformed printer-form FK fields no longer escape as HTTP 500: a non-numeric client_id/driver_id raised ValueError and an unknown driver_id hit a FOREIGN KEY constraint. Both are now 400/404 HTMX fragments, and the duplicated field checks moved into _validate_fields(). - Package exports stream. build_intunewin() encrypts the inner ZIP in 1 MB chunks against temp files with a streaming HMAC and SHA256, and both endpoints serve the result with FileResponse plus a background cleanup task. A 100 MB driver used to be held in memory three or four times over per concurrent download. The byte layout is unchanged. - FileResponse also escapes the download filename, which was previously interpolated raw into Content-Disposition. - python-multipart >= 0.0.18 (CVE-2024-53981, reachable from /drivers/upload) and Pillow >= 10.3 (CVE-2024-28219, reachable from icon upload). - icons.py reads cfg.ICONS_DIR instead of re-deriving the path from DATA_DIR, matching the .intunewin export. UI - Sidebar/topbar shell, inline SVG icon macros (partials/icons.html), card and data-table components, grouped printer list, and the dedicated /printers/new page replacing partials/printer_form.html. Tests - 194 pass with a bare `pytest tests/`: tests/conftest.py now forces cfg.COOKIE_SECURE = False like the e2e conftest already did, so the Secure cookie is no longer dropped over http://testserver. - New coverage for the malformed-FK guards, the chunk-boundary cases in the encrypt loop (every residue mod _CHUNK plus a multi-megabyte payload), temp-dir cleanup after both exports, and the whole COOKIE_SECURE matrix. - test_printer_edit.py located the Edit button by its translated label, so it only passed on English-locale machines. It now targets the showModal() hook, which also cuts the e2e run from 84s to 15s. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
128 lines
7.8 KiB
Markdown
128 lines
7.8 KiB
Markdown
# CLAUDE.md
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Guide for Claude Code (claude.ai/code) work in repo.
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## Commands
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**Run tests:**
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```bash
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pytest tests/ # whole suite (no env vars needed)
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pytest tests/test_inf_parser.py # single test file (no tests/unit/ dir)
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pytest tests/ -k "test_name" # single test by name
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```
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Both `tests/conftest.py` (`tmp_data_dir`) and `tests/e2e/conftest.py` force
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`cfg.COOKIE_SECURE = False`, because `TestClient` talks plain HTTP to
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`http://testserver` and a `Secure` cookie would be dropped — every request would
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land on a *new* `Owner` and ~41 tests would 404. Tests asserting the `Secure`
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branch (`test_secure_mode_*` in `tests/test_session.py`) monkeypatch it back to
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`True`.
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**Run dev server:**
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```bash
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export DATA_DIR=/tmp/imptune_data
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export COOKIE_SECURE=false # plain HTTP — omit if serving behind TLS
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uvicorn imptune.main:app --reload --port 8000
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```
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**Docker:**
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```bash
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docker-compose up
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docker build -t imptune .
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```
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**Install deps:**
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```bash
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pip install -r requirements.txt -r requirements-dev.txt
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```
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## Architecture
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ImpTune make printer deploy packages (`.intunewin` for Intune, `.zip` for NinjaRMM) from Windows driver ZIPs + web UI. No external services — single FastAPI + SQLite + Docker volume.
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**Request flow:**
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1. Driver upload → `api/drivers.py` → `services/inf_parser.py` parse INF → `storage/driver_store.py` store by SHA256 → Peewee `Driver` record (shared/global — visible to every Owner)
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2. Printer config → `api/printers.py` → `db/models.py` `Printer` record (links Driver FK, scoped to `request.state.owner`)
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3. Icon upload → `api/icons.py` → Pillow validate PNG 256×256 → SHA256 storage → `Icon` record
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4. Package export → `api/packages.py` → `generators/script_generator.py` render Jinja2 PS1 templates → `generators/intunewin_builder.py` encrypt ZIP (AES-256-CBC + HMAC-SHA256)
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**Key modules:**
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- `imptune/config.py` — `DATA_DIR`, `DB_PATH`, `DRIVERS_DIR`, `ICONS_DIR`, `COOKIE_SECURE` from env
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- `imptune/db/database.py` — SQLite WAL mode + `foreign_keys=1`; all models inherit `BaseModel`; `init_db()` also backfills `owner_id` on pre-per-owner-scoping DBs into a synthetic legacy `Owner` (key written to `{DATA_DIR}/legacy_owner_key.txt`)
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- `imptune/services/session.py` — `OwnerSessionMiddleware` resolves `request.state.owner` from the `imptune_owner_key` cookie, creating one on first visit (skips `/health`)
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- `imptune/services/inf_parser.py` — auto-detect encoding (UTF-16/UTF-8/cp1252), resolve `%TOKEN%` from `[Strings]`, handle multi-model INFs
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- `imptune/generators/intunewin_builder.py` — Python-native `.intunewin` (ZIP-in-ZIP); IV 16 bytes (not 32); match reference tool `1.8.6.0` output
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- `imptune/templates/scripts/` — Jinja2 templates for `install.ps1`, `uninstall.ps1`, `detect.ps1`
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**Per-owner storage:** `Printer`/`Client` (groups) are scoped to an `Owner` identified by an opaque bearer key in a cookie — no accounts. `Driver` stays global/shared. Every route taking a `printer_id`/`client_id` must filter/check `.owner == request.state.owner` (404, not 403, on mismatch) — printer IDs are small sequential ints, so a list-only filter isn't enough. Onboarding modal (`templates/base.html`, gated on `request.state.is_new_owner`) offers "download backup key" (`GET /session/key/download`, marks `Owner.is_permanent`) vs. temporary; `/session/restore` re-attaches a browser to a previously downloaded key. In tests, use the `owner` fixture (`tests/conftest.py`) when creating `Printer`/`Client` rows directly via the ORM so the `client` fixture's cookie-scoped requests can see them.
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**UI stack:** Pico CSS + HTMX 2 + Alpine.js 3 + Jinja2 server-side templates.
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**Design layer (`static/app.css`):** a token + component layer over Pico. Tokens
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(`--im-*`) are declared three times — `:root:not([data-theme=dark])`, the
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`prefers-color-scheme: dark` block, and `[data-theme=dark]` — mirroring Pico's
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own selectors so equal specificity + later source order wins; a new color must be
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added to all three. Pico vars are remapped from those tokens, so use `--im-*` in
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components. Prose is set in the system UI face, machine values (IPs, ports, INF
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names, PS commands) in `--im-mono`. Components: `.card`, `.rail` (the
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driver → printer → package pipeline on the dashboard), `.data-table`, `.badge`,
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`.pill`, `.kv`, `.cmd`, `.empty`, `.form-section`, `.toolbar`. Because the edit
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dialog renders inside a table cell, `dialog` resets inherited `text-align` /
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`white-space` — keep that.
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**Shell:** `base.html` owns the sidebar + topbar; pages fill the `crumb`,
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`page_title`, `page_actions`, and `content` blocks and must not render their own
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`<h1>`. Icons come from `{% import "partials/icons.html" as ico %}` →
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`{{ ico.i('printer') }}` — inline SVG with no text nodes, because E2E tests read
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`textContent` of nav links to assert the translated label. Nav links are
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`{{ ico.i(...) }}<span x-text="...">`: never add count badges or other text
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inside them.
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**i18n:** every user-facing string goes through `$store.i18n.t('key')` with the
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English text as the element's fallback body, and keys must be added to *both*
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`fr` and `en` in `base.html`. Server-rendered HTMX fragments (icon-upload
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confirmation, `_error_response`) are English-only.
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The store's default language follows `navigator.language`, so E2E specs must
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**never locate a control by its visible label** — `button:has-text('Edit')`
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matched only on English-locale machines and timed out everywhere else. Target a
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structural hook instead (`button[onclick*='showModal']`), except in
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`test_i18n_toggle.py`, which asserts the labels on purpose and pins
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`locale=` per context.
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**Client-side filter:** `Alpine.store('filter')` holds the printer search text.
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Rows and group cards carry `data-search` (lowercased) and `x-show` off that
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store, so HTMX-swapped rows keep filtering. A group's `data-search` must be a
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superset of its rows' — otherwise a matching row hides inside a hidden group.
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`.col-defaults` / `.col-arch` / `.col-used` / `.col-added` mark columns dropped
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on narrow screens or in the add-printer sidebar (`.form-aside`).
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**HTMX pattern:** Forms `hx-post`, swap `#driver-list` / `#printer-list` / `#client-list` targets. Errors return inline HTML fragments (HTTP 400/409) via `_error_response()`. Success return partials from `templates/partials/`.
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**PowerShell install script notes:**
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- WOW64 64-bit relaunch guard (Intune run 32-bit, `pnputil` need 64-bit)
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- UAC self-elevation for user context (SYSTEM context skip)
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- Two-step: `pnputil /add-driver` then `Add-PrinterDriver` + `Add-PrinterPort` + `Add-Printer`
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- All idempotent (`-ErrorAction SilentlyContinue`)
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## Test Setup
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`conftest.py` monkeypatch `config.DATA_DIR` + `config.DB_PATH` to temp dir per test. `client` fixture yield `TestClient(app)` with isolated SQLite. E2E in `tests/e2e/` use Playwright.
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## Environment Variables
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| Var | Default | Purpose |
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|-----|---------|---------|
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| `DATA_DIR` | `/data` | Storage root (DB + drivers + icons) |
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| `PORT` | `8000` | Server port |
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| `COOKIE_SECURE` | `true` | Owner-session cookie `Secure` flag. Set `false` for plain-HTTP serving or the browser drops the cookie and a new Owner is created on every request. `false` also makes the cookie **memory-only** (no `Max-Age`) — see below. |
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`COOKIE_SECURE=false` degrades the session instead of weakening the credential:
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`services/session.cookie_kwargs()` drops `max_age`, so the browser holds the
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owner key in memory and the session ends when the window closes. Everything
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still persists server-side; only the browser's link to it is temporary. Both
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cookie-setting call sites (the middleware and `POST /session/restore`) must go
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through `cookie_kwargs()`. `request.state.ephemeral_session` mirrors the flag,
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and `base.html` renders the `#ephemeral-session-warning` banner plus an extra
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paragraph in the onboarding modal off it. Changing this touches
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`tests/test_session.py::test_insecure_mode_*` / `test_secure_mode_*`. |