Session - COOKIE_SECURE=false no longer persists the owner key for ten years. services/session.cookie_kwargs() drops max_age in that mode, so the browser holds the key in memory and the session ends with the window. Everything still persists server-side; only the browser link is temporary. base.html shows a warning banner (FR/EN) and an extra paragraph in the onboarding modal, and the README explains the trade-off and the backup-key escape hatch. - Both cookie writers (middleware, POST /session/restore) go through cookie_kwargs() so the policy cannot drift between them. - The CSRF guard on /session/restore compared request.url.scheme against the Origin header. Behind a TLS-terminating proxy uvicorn sees http while the browser sends https, so every legitimate restore was rejected with 403. It now compares hosts only, including X-Forwarded-Host. - /static/*, /favicon.ico and /robots.txt skip the middleware. Each cookieless hit was inserting an Owner row no browser could ever use. Reliability - Malformed printer-form FK fields no longer escape as HTTP 500: a non-numeric client_id/driver_id raised ValueError and an unknown driver_id hit a FOREIGN KEY constraint. Both are now 400/404 HTMX fragments, and the duplicated field checks moved into _validate_fields(). - Package exports stream. build_intunewin() encrypts the inner ZIP in 1 MB chunks against temp files with a streaming HMAC and SHA256, and both endpoints serve the result with FileResponse plus a background cleanup task. A 100 MB driver used to be held in memory three or four times over per concurrent download. The byte layout is unchanged. - FileResponse also escapes the download filename, which was previously interpolated raw into Content-Disposition. - python-multipart >= 0.0.18 (CVE-2024-53981, reachable from /drivers/upload) and Pillow >= 10.3 (CVE-2024-28219, reachable from icon upload). - icons.py reads cfg.ICONS_DIR instead of re-deriving the path from DATA_DIR, matching the .intunewin export. UI - Sidebar/topbar shell, inline SVG icon macros (partials/icons.html), card and data-table components, grouped printer list, and the dedicated /printers/new page replacing partials/printer_form.html. Tests - 194 pass with a bare `pytest tests/`: tests/conftest.py now forces cfg.COOKIE_SECURE = False like the e2e conftest already did, so the Secure cookie is no longer dropped over http://testserver. - New coverage for the malformed-FK guards, the chunk-boundary cases in the encrypt loop (every residue mod _CHUNK plus a multi-megabyte payload), temp-dir cleanup after both exports, and the whole COOKIE_SECURE matrix. - test_printer_edit.py located the Edit button by its translated label, so it only passed on English-locale machines. It now targets the showModal() hook, which also cuts the e2e run from 84s to 15s. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
7.8 KiB
CLAUDE.md
Guide for Claude Code (claude.ai/code) work in repo.
Commands
Run tests:
pytest tests/ # whole suite (no env vars needed)
pytest tests/test_inf_parser.py # single test file (no tests/unit/ dir)
pytest tests/ -k "test_name" # single test by name
Both tests/conftest.py (tmp_data_dir) and tests/e2e/conftest.py force
cfg.COOKIE_SECURE = False, because TestClient talks plain HTTP to
http://testserver and a Secure cookie would be dropped — every request would
land on a new Owner and ~41 tests would 404. Tests asserting the Secure
branch (test_secure_mode_* in tests/test_session.py) monkeypatch it back to
True.
Run dev server:
export DATA_DIR=/tmp/imptune_data
export COOKIE_SECURE=false # plain HTTP — omit if serving behind TLS
uvicorn imptune.main:app --reload --port 8000
Docker:
docker-compose up
docker build -t imptune .
Install deps:
pip install -r requirements.txt -r requirements-dev.txt
Architecture
ImpTune make printer deploy packages (.intunewin for Intune, .zip for NinjaRMM) from Windows driver ZIPs + web UI. No external services — single FastAPI + SQLite + Docker volume.
Request flow:
- Driver upload →
api/drivers.py→services/inf_parser.pyparse INF →storage/driver_store.pystore by SHA256 → PeeweeDriverrecord (shared/global — visible to every Owner) - Printer config →
api/printers.py→db/models.pyPrinterrecord (links Driver FK, scoped torequest.state.owner) - Icon upload →
api/icons.py→ Pillow validate PNG 256×256 → SHA256 storage →Iconrecord - Package export →
api/packages.py→generators/script_generator.pyrender Jinja2 PS1 templates →generators/intunewin_builder.pyencrypt ZIP (AES-256-CBC + HMAC-SHA256)
Key modules:
imptune/config.py—DATA_DIR,DB_PATH,DRIVERS_DIR,ICONS_DIR,COOKIE_SECUREfrom envimptune/db/database.py— SQLite WAL mode +foreign_keys=1; all models inheritBaseModel;init_db()also backfillsowner_idon pre-per-owner-scoping DBs into a synthetic legacyOwner(key written to{DATA_DIR}/legacy_owner_key.txt)imptune/services/session.py—OwnerSessionMiddlewareresolvesrequest.state.ownerfrom theimptune_owner_keycookie, creating one on first visit (skips/health)imptune/services/inf_parser.py— auto-detect encoding (UTF-16/UTF-8/cp1252), resolve%TOKEN%from[Strings], handle multi-model INFsimptune/generators/intunewin_builder.py— Python-native.intunewin(ZIP-in-ZIP); IV 16 bytes (not 32); match reference tool1.8.6.0outputimptune/templates/scripts/— Jinja2 templates forinstall.ps1,uninstall.ps1,detect.ps1
Per-owner storage: Printer/Client (groups) are scoped to an Owner identified by an opaque bearer key in a cookie — no accounts. Driver stays global/shared. Every route taking a printer_id/client_id must filter/check .owner == request.state.owner (404, not 403, on mismatch) — printer IDs are small sequential ints, so a list-only filter isn't enough. Onboarding modal (templates/base.html, gated on request.state.is_new_owner) offers "download backup key" (GET /session/key/download, marks Owner.is_permanent) vs. temporary; /session/restore re-attaches a browser to a previously downloaded key. In tests, use the owner fixture (tests/conftest.py) when creating Printer/Client rows directly via the ORM so the client fixture's cookie-scoped requests can see them.
UI stack: Pico CSS + HTMX 2 + Alpine.js 3 + Jinja2 server-side templates.
Design layer (static/app.css): a token + component layer over Pico. Tokens
(--im-*) are declared three times — :root:not([data-theme=dark]), the
prefers-color-scheme: dark block, and [data-theme=dark] — mirroring Pico's
own selectors so equal specificity + later source order wins; a new color must be
added to all three. Pico vars are remapped from those tokens, so use --im-* in
components. Prose is set in the system UI face, machine values (IPs, ports, INF
names, PS commands) in --im-mono. Components: .card, .rail (the
driver → printer → package pipeline on the dashboard), .data-table, .badge,
.pill, .kv, .cmd, .empty, .form-section, .toolbar. Because the edit
dialog renders inside a table cell, dialog resets inherited text-align /
white-space — keep that.
Shell: base.html owns the sidebar + topbar; pages fill the crumb,
page_title, page_actions, and content blocks and must not render their own
<h1>. Icons come from {% import "partials/icons.html" as ico %} →
{{ ico.i('printer') }} — inline SVG with no text nodes, because E2E tests read
textContent of nav links to assert the translated label. Nav links are
{{ ico.i(...) }}<span x-text="...">: never add count badges or other text
inside them.
i18n: every user-facing string goes through $store.i18n.t('key') with the
English text as the element's fallback body, and keys must be added to both
fr and en in base.html. Server-rendered HTMX fragments (icon-upload
confirmation, _error_response) are English-only.
The store's default language follows navigator.language, so E2E specs must
never locate a control by its visible label — button:has-text('Edit')
matched only on English-locale machines and timed out everywhere else. Target a
structural hook instead (button[onclick*='showModal']), except in
test_i18n_toggle.py, which asserts the labels on purpose and pins
locale= per context.
Client-side filter: Alpine.store('filter') holds the printer search text.
Rows and group cards carry data-search (lowercased) and x-show off that
store, so HTMX-swapped rows keep filtering. A group's data-search must be a
superset of its rows' — otherwise a matching row hides inside a hidden group.
.col-defaults / .col-arch / .col-used / .col-added mark columns dropped
on narrow screens or in the add-printer sidebar (.form-aside).
HTMX pattern: Forms hx-post, swap #driver-list / #printer-list / #client-list targets. Errors return inline HTML fragments (HTTP 400/409) via _error_response(). Success return partials from templates/partials/.
PowerShell install script notes:
- WOW64 64-bit relaunch guard (Intune run 32-bit,
pnputilneed 64-bit) - UAC self-elevation for user context (SYSTEM context skip)
- Two-step:
pnputil /add-driverthenAdd-PrinterDriver+Add-PrinterPort+Add-Printer - All idempotent (
-ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
Test Setup
conftest.py monkeypatch config.DATA_DIR + config.DB_PATH to temp dir per test. client fixture yield TestClient(app) with isolated SQLite. E2E in tests/e2e/ use Playwright.
Environment Variables
| Var | Default | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
DATA_DIR |
/data |
Storage root (DB + drivers + icons) |
PORT |
8000 |
Server port |
COOKIE_SECURE |
true |
Owner-session cookie Secure flag. Set false for plain-HTTP serving or the browser drops the cookie and a new Owner is created on every request. false also makes the cookie memory-only (no Max-Age) — see below. |
COOKIE_SECURE=false degrades the session instead of weakening the credential:
services/session.cookie_kwargs() drops max_age, so the browser holds the
owner key in memory and the session ends when the window closes. Everything
still persists server-side; only the browser's link to it is temporary. Both
cookie-setting call sites (the middleware and POST /session/restore) must go
through cookie_kwargs(). request.state.ephemeral_session mirrors the flag,
and base.html renders the #ephemeral-session-warning banner plus an extra
paragraph in the onboarding modal off it. Changing this touches
tests/test_session.py::test_insecure_mode_* / test_secure_mode_*.