Feature work:
- Certificate (app-only) auth per profile: cert store, context/Graph client
factories, automated app-registration provisioning (delegated + application
permissions, admin consent), and a SessionManager seam that resolves the auth
model per profile.
- Scheduled reports: repositories, hosted service/runner/coordinator, report
pages, and email delivery (app-only Mail.Send).
- Tenant-wide user-access audit when no site is selected.
Audit fixes:
- Site enumeration: app-only discovery used Graph getAllSites (needs Graph
Sites.Read.All the cert app lacks) and silently returned empty. Switched to
the admin-host CSOM TenantSiteEnumerator, matching the scheduler; both auth
models now share one enumeration path.
- Group expansion: the scan records a SharePoint group as a single principal, so
user-centric audits found nothing for group-granted access. Resolve group
membership (shared by audit + scheduler) and attribute it to the target user.
- M365 group claims: the resolver only recognized AAD security groups
(c:0t.c|). Group-connected/Teams sites grant via the M365 group claim
(c:0o.c|…|<guid>[_o]); now expanded too, resolving owners for the "_o" claim.
- Provision Directory.Read.All as an application permission so M365/AAD group
expansion works under the cert identity.
Also: ignore data/appcerts/ (encrypted certificate key material).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Microsoft 365 Group / Teams-connected sites surface access-denied on some
CSOM calls as a raw "(403) FORBIDDEN" WebException carrying
0x80070005 (E_ACCESSDENIED), not as a typed ServerException with
ServerErrorTypeName = System.UnauthorizedAccessException. IsAccessDenied
only matched the typed shape, so those denials became generic
InvalidOperationExceptions the elevation coordinator never caught — no
auto-elevation ran and the operation failed even for a SharePoint admin.
Walk the inner-exception chain and treat any of these as access-denied:
the typed ServerException, a WebException with HTTP 403, or a message
containing the E_ACCESSDENIED HRESULT. Per-site dedupe still caps elevation
to one retry, so a 403 elevation cannot fix (policy/endpoint block) won't loop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The "Auto-elevate ownership when permission scan is denied" setting was
dead code: the toggle was persisted but never read, the audit flow never
passed its onAccessDenied callback, and EnrichException wrapped every CSOM
error (including ServerUnauthorizedAccessException) into a generic
InvalidOperationException so the access-denied catch could never match.
Centralize elevation instead of per-call-site callbacks:
- Throw typed SharePointAccessDeniedException from EnrichException on
access-denied, preserving the failing site URL and enriched diagnostic.
- Add scoped IElevationCoordinator that catches it, and when AutoTakeOwnership
is enabled takes site-collection admin via the tenant admin endpoint and
retries the operation once. Per-site dedupe prevents loops; admin-host
denials are not treated as ownership issues. Retry is safe because each
wrapped operation closure re-issues its own CSOM loads.
- Wrap all site-scoped operations (Storage, Permissions, Duplicates, Search,
VersionCleanup, FolderStructure, BulkMembers, FileTransfer, Templates) and
the UserAccessAudit per-site scan in the coordinator.
- Drop the unused onAccessDenied parameter from IUserAccessAuditService.
Elevation still requires SharePoint tenant admin rights on the signed-in
account; the coordinator surfaces a clear message when that is missing.
Also keeps the prior StorageService change that avoids admin-gated
folder.StorageMetrics (403 for delegated non-admin tokens).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
kawa