Commit Graph
5 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
kawaandClaude Haiku 4.5 f70ba93e7a feat: session mode parsing, memory-only cookies, single-user mode
- COOKIE_SECURE env now accepts: 'true' (secure), 'false' (memory-only), 'single_user' (no cookie)
- config.parse_cookie_mode() returns (COOKIE_SECURE, SINGLE_USER) tuple for routing
- single_user_owner() returns oldest Owner for test/local deployments
- session cookie respects mode: Max-Age only in secure mode, dropped for memory-only
- base.html renders ephemeral-session and single-user banners per mode
- Tests: comprehensive coverage for all three modes with monkeypatch configs
- CLAUDE.md + README docs updated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-05 09:21:18 +02:00
kawaandClaude Opus 5 a8bcf7cdeb chore: untrack compiled bytecode
.gitignore has listed __pycache__/ and *.py[cod] since before these were
committed, so 75 .pyc blobs were being carried and re-diffed on every
interpreter run for no reason. Removed from the index only — the files
stay on disk and are now actually ignored.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-04 18:00:25 +02:00
kawaandClaude Opus 5 b397d3dc3d feat: memory-only sessions on HTTP, streamed exports, UI refresh
Session

- COOKIE_SECURE=false no longer persists the owner key for ten years.
  services/session.cookie_kwargs() drops max_age in that mode, so the
  browser holds the key in memory and the session ends with the window.
  Everything still persists server-side; only the browser link is
  temporary. base.html shows a warning banner (FR/EN) and an extra
  paragraph in the onboarding modal, and the README explains the
  trade-off and the backup-key escape hatch.
- Both cookie writers (middleware, POST /session/restore) go through
  cookie_kwargs() so the policy cannot drift between them.
- The CSRF guard on /session/restore compared request.url.scheme against
  the Origin header. Behind a TLS-terminating proxy uvicorn sees http
  while the browser sends https, so every legitimate restore was
  rejected with 403. It now compares hosts only, including
  X-Forwarded-Host.
- /static/*, /favicon.ico and /robots.txt skip the middleware. Each
  cookieless hit was inserting an Owner row no browser could ever use.

Reliability

- Malformed printer-form FK fields no longer escape as HTTP 500:
  a non-numeric client_id/driver_id raised ValueError and an unknown
  driver_id hit a FOREIGN KEY constraint. Both are now 400/404 HTMX
  fragments, and the duplicated field checks moved into
  _validate_fields().
- Package exports stream. build_intunewin() encrypts the inner ZIP in
  1 MB chunks against temp files with a streaming HMAC and SHA256, and
  both endpoints serve the result with FileResponse plus a background
  cleanup task. A 100 MB driver used to be held in memory three or four
  times over per concurrent download. The byte layout is unchanged.
- FileResponse also escapes the download filename, which was previously
  interpolated raw into Content-Disposition.
- python-multipart >= 0.0.18 (CVE-2024-53981, reachable from
  /drivers/upload) and Pillow >= 10.3 (CVE-2024-28219, reachable from
  icon upload).
- icons.py reads cfg.ICONS_DIR instead of re-deriving the path from
  DATA_DIR, matching the .intunewin export.

UI

- Sidebar/topbar shell, inline SVG icon macros (partials/icons.html),
  card and data-table components, grouped printer list, and the
  dedicated /printers/new page replacing partials/printer_form.html.

Tests

- 194 pass with a bare `pytest tests/`: tests/conftest.py now forces
  cfg.COOKIE_SECURE = False like the e2e conftest already did, so the
  Secure cookie is no longer dropped over http://testserver.
- New coverage for the malformed-FK guards, the chunk-boundary cases in
  the encrypt loop (every residue mod _CHUNK plus a multi-megabyte
  payload), temp-dir cleanup after both exports, and the whole
  COOKIE_SECURE matrix.
- test_printer_edit.py located the Edit button by its translated label,
  so it only passed on English-locale machines. It now targets the
  showModal() hook, which also cuts the e2e run from 84s to 15s.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-04 17:58:49 +02:00
kawaandClaude Haiku 4.5 ed41f7f520 feat(session): per-owner printer/config storage via cookie-scoped bearer key
Printers and groups (Client) are now scoped to an Owner identified by an opaque
bearer key (secrets.token_urlsafe(32)) stored in an httponly cookie, defaulting
to temporary. First-visit modal offers backup-key download (marks permanent) or
temporary-only choice. /session/restore re-attaches a fresh browser to a saved
key. Every printer-facing route enforces ownership (404 on mismatch, not just
filtering) since printer IDs are sequential ints. Drivers stay global/shared.

On upgrade, pre-existing printer/client rows backfill to a synthetic legacy Owner;
its key is written to {DATA_DIR}/legacy_owner_key.txt for manual restore.

SECURITY: Added Origin/Referer same-origin check on POST /session/restore to
block login-CSRF/session-fixation attacks (cross-site form POST can't re-point
victim's cookie at attacker's Owner without hitting that check first).

Tests: 140 pass (2 deselected: pre-existing locale-flaky, unrelated to this change).
Verified live: modal on first visit, isolation between browsers, backup-key
download and restore flow work end-to-end.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-04 11:29:43 +02:00
kawa 55516ee10f Commit initial 2026-04-15 17:57:12 +02:00